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*
This paper proposes a reduced form approach to identify the presence of monopoly
power in oligopolies characterized by vertical product differentiation. In a fairly general
model I derive an explicit solution for the reduced form pricing equations under the
hypothesis that firms behave collusively. The central comparative statics result states that
a product's price depends only on its own quality and not on the quality of its competi-
tors. I propose econometric tests implied by this result, requiring only the data used in
popular hedonic studies (prices and physical characteristics). The tests are applied to the
market for spreadsheets in the U.S. (1986-1991) and to the market for "engine variants"
in the 1990 French car market. The empirical results are encouraging, because they are
consistent with some a priori evidence on these industries. Nevertheless, to widen to the
scope for economic applications, some further generalizations of the model are called
for.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Überprüfung der Monopolmacht bei qualitativ differenzierten Produkten
In dem Beitrag wird ein reduzierter Gleichungsansatz vorgeschlagen, um Monopolmacht
auf Oligopolmärkten mit vertikaler Produktdifferenzierung festzustellen. In einem ziem-
lich allgemeinen Modell wird die explizite Lösung für die reduzierte Form der Preis-
gleichung unter der Hypothese abgeleitet, daß die Unternehmen sich kollusiv verhalten.
Das zentrale komparativ-statische Ergebnis besagt, daß der Produktpreis nur von der
eigenen Qualität und nicht der Qualität der Konkurrenten abhängt. Es wird ein ökonome-
trischer Test vorgeschlagen, der dieses Ergebnis berücksichtigt und sich nur auf Daten
stützt, die in üblichen hedonistischen Untersuchungen mit Preisen und Produktmerk-
malen verwendet werden. Der Test wird auf den Markt für Tabellenkalkulations-Pro-
gramme in den USA (1986-1991) angewendet und auf den Markt für "Motorvarianten"
als Teilmarkt  des französischen Automobilmarkts (1990). Die empirischen Ergebnisse
sind vielversprechend, weil sie mit a priori Annahmen über diese Industriezweige konsi-
stent sind. Dennoch erscheint ein gewisse Verallgemeinerung des Modells angebracht zu
sein, um sein ökonomisches Anwendungsspektrum zu erweitern.
                                               
*  I thank Neil Gandal for providing the data on the spreadsheet market. I benefited from discussions
with Rob Alessi, Hans Bloemen, Jan Bouckaert, Eric van Damme and Johan Stennek. Errors are
mine. Financial assistance from the EC Human Capital and Mobility Program is grateful acknowl-
edged.1. Introduction
During the past two decades there has been a revived interest in the empirical
identification of market power in oligopolistic industries. Price--cost margins from
accounting data are no longer taken to be reliable measures of market power. Instead,
market power is inferred indirectly from observed firm behavior (prices, sales) and the
predictions of a suitable oligopoly model. Most of this research has focused on the
estimation of structural form models.
1 A structural form model of an oligopoly typically
consists of both a demand equation and a ''supply'' equation, determining the oligopolistic
equilibrium. Estimating the structural parameters of this system is usually regarded as
very appealing because it allows for a clear economic interpretation of the empirical
results (e.g. the estimation of price-cost margins), and because it provides a basis for
quantitative policy analysis through model simulations.
The structural form approach, however, also has its drawbacks. First and most
importantly, it requires specific assumptions about the functional forms. A hypothesis
test for the presence of market power is then always conditional on a ''correct''
specification of the demand and supply functions. Second, the structural form approach
requires data on all endogenous variables in the model, which is not always possible.
Finally, the econometric procedures required to estimate even simple structural form
models are frequently computationally burdensome. To avoid these problems, a reduced
form approach may often be a valid alternative to identify market power. This approach
searches for comparative statics predictions that necessarily hold in the presence of
monopoly power and not under more competitive behavior, such as Bertrand-Nash
behavior. These comparative statics predictions can then be tested by estimating a
reduced form regression, writing the relevant endogenous variables (such as prices,
quantities or revenues) as a function of the exogenous variables solely.
In this paper I propose a reduced form approach to identify the presence of monopoly
power in oligopolies characterized by vertical product differentiation, i.e. differentiation
in quality. In a fairly general model of one-dimensional vertical product differentiation I
                                               
1  Geroski (1988) and Bresnahan (1989) provide surveys of the literature.2
derive an explicit solution for the reduced form pricing equations under the hypothesis
that firms collude by maximizing their joint-profits. The central comparative statics result
states that a product's price depends only on its own quality and not on the quality of its
competitors. In the absence of collusion this comparative statics result is not likely to
hold. I propose econometric tests implied by the comparative statics result. The tests
require only the data used in popular ''hedonic'' studies, i.e. data on the prices and
physical characteristics of the products.
To illustrate, I have applied the tests to two different industries: the market for
spreadsheets in the U.S.(1986-1991) and the market for ''engine variants'' in the 1990
French car market. The empirical results are encouraging because they are consistent
with some a priori evidence on the presence of monopoly power in these industries. This
indicates the usefulness of the tests as a first approach in detecting the presence of
collusion when there is vertical product differentiation. Nevertheless, to widen the scope
for economic applications, some further generalizations of the model are called for.
Bresnahan (1987) has used a structural model of vertical product differentiation to
test for the presence of collusion in the U.S. car market during the mid-fifties. He finds
evidence for collusion in 1954 and 1956, interrupted by Bertrand-Nash behavior in 1955.
Bresnahan's model is a special case of the model presented in this paper, it requires more
data, and, as discussed by Berry (1994), it is computationally demanding. It would be
interesting to investigate whether the simple tests developed in the present paper would
yield similar conclusions as those obtained by Bresnahan.
Almost all of our recent knowledge on market power uses identification arguments
based on comparative statics in either cost or demand. There have not yet been formal
identification arguments based on comparative statics in variables that influence both cost
and demand, such as quality. Furthermore, most of our knowledge on market power
comes from the estimation of structural form models of oligopoly. Interest in the testable
predictions from reduced form oligopoly models has been scarce. The most notable
exception is by Panzar and Rosse (1987). They discover a testable comparative statics
prediction about the effect of factor prices -- or more generally all exogenous variables
influencing cost but not demand – on revenues. This prediction necessarily holds in the3
presence of monopoly power, and not under more competitive behavior.
2 Panzar and
Rosse emphasize the generality of their result and the applicability even when data on
prices and quantities are not separately available. In principle, their test can be applied to
all industries, including industries characterized by product differentiation. In practice,
however, industries with product differentiation often fail to meet the data requirements
in order to implement the test. Data on revenues and on factor prices (or other
exogenous variables affecting cost but not demand) are generally not available at the
product level. In industries with product differentiation the most accessible data come
from retail catalogues, providing product-level information on prices and physical
characteristics. Physical characteristics influence both cost and demand, so that Panzar
and Rosse's test cannot be applied. In contrast, the tests developed in this paper, or some
variant thereof, are immediately applicable, if the physical characteristics provide a
reasonable measure of quality.
The model is presented in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 derive the reduced form pricing
equation and the central comparative statics result. Section 5 proposes the empirical
tests, which are applied in section 6. Section 7 provides suggested extensions.
2. The model
Consider the following model of vertical product differentiation, related to the model
introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978).
3 There are N consumers, all endowed with
income I, and n + 1 goods, i = 0 ￿￿￿ n, where good 0 is an outside good. A good i has a
quality vi and is sold at a price pi. Rank the qualities in increasing order as v0 < v1 < ￿￿￿ <
vn. The conditional indirect utility of a consumer of type q  buying product i is given by
ui(q ) = I + viq - pi,                 i = 1 ￿￿￿ n
                                               
2  More precisely, they show that the sum of the effect of the factor price elasticities on a monopolist's
reduced form revenue equation is always nonpositive. This property may not hold in the absence of
monopoly power.
3  Mussa and Rosen look at a continuum of products. They make use of quite different techniques, in
a mechanism design framework. Nevertheless, some of the results here show some interesting
similarities, as the interested reader may verify.4
where q˛ [ ] q q ,  is a taste parameter representing consumer q's marginal willingness to
pay for quality, with 0 £ q  < q . The cumulative distribution of the taste parameter q in
the population of consumers is denoted by F(x) = P(q £ x), with corresponding density
f(x). Let F(x) be continuous, differentiable and nondecreasing, with F(q ) = 0 and
F(q ) = 1.
A consumer of type q is indifferent between purchasing good i and i-1 if q vi - pi =
q vi-1 - pi-1, i.e. if













Assume that in equilibrium the indifferent consumers are ranked as follows:
q q q q < < <￿￿￿< 1 2  . Below it will be checked whether this assumption is indeed satified.
Market demand for each good i, i=1 ￿￿￿ n, is then positive and given by the mass of
consumers with a taste parameter q˛ (qi, qi+1], i.e.
q F F N i i i = - + ( ( ) ( )) q q 1 (2.2)
where for consistency of notation q q n+ ” 1  , so that F(qn+1) = 1.
4
There are n firms. Each firm i, i = 1 ￿￿￿ n, sells a distinct good i at a marginal cost ci =
c(vi), which is independent of output but increasing and convex in quality. Prices are
determined as follows. The price of the outside good, p0, is exogenously given, say on a
perfectly competitive low quality market. The prices of goods i, i = 1 ￿￿￿ n, are








￿￿￿ = ￿ -
1
Although firms may in principle also choose the qualities of their products, I consider
these choices as exogenous at the pricing stage. The justification is that firms can adjust
prices faster than qualities. Notice that the qualities vi, influencing both marginal cost and
                                               
4  The assumption that q q < 1 implies that market demand for the outside good is also positive in
equilibrium. The results in this paper continue to hold for the alternative case in which no
consumers would buy the outside good in equilibrium.5
demand, are the only exogenous variables (other than p0) in the model.
5 The
identification of monopoly power should hence be based on comparative statics in
quality.
3. Reduced form pricing equations
The first-order conditions for joint profit maximization, defining a collusive pricing
equilibrium are:
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The system of n first-order conditions can be solved to obtain n reduced form pricing
equations, writing price as a function of the qualities solely. The solution method follows
two steps. First a solution for the indifferent consumers qi is derived. This solution is
then used to derive the reduced form pricing equations.
The n-th first-order condition can be rewritten as:
















                                               
5  For econometric purposes, it is sufficient to view the qualities vi as predetermined, rather than as
exogenous. They capture the effects of some '' truely exogenous'' variables, either influencing
marginal cost (e.g. factor prices) or demand.6
This may be substituted in the (n - 1)-th first-order condition to obtain a similar
expression for pn-1 - cn-1. Repeating this substitution gives the following recursive system
for i = 1￿￿￿ n:

















where, for consistency of notation, c0 ” p0 refers to the price of the outside good. This





























Assume the function g(x) is monotonically increasing. This assumption is satisfied for
many distribution functions, including the uniform, the Pareto, the exponential, the
normal and the logistic. This then yields the following unique solution for the taste






















-1(y) is the inverse function of g(x).
The reduced form demand equations are now easily derived by substituting the
solutions for qi, given by (3.1), in (2.2). The derivation of the reduced form pricing
equations requires just a little extra work. Given initial values for the quality and price of
the outside good, v0 and p0 ” c0, the price of good i=1 ￿￿￿ n, is recursively determined
from
pi = pi-1 + qi(vi - vi-1) ,
as implied by (2.1). Substituting the solutions for qi then yields the desired reduced form
collusive pricing equations:
pi = po + g








































- ￿ . (3.2)7
It remains to check whether the maintained assumption that all goods (including the
outside good) have positive market shares in equilbrium is indeed satisfied, i.e. whether
q  < q1 < q2 < ￿￿￿ < qn < q . From the solution for qi and the fact that g
-1(x) is
monotonically increasing, it follows that qi < qi+1 for i = 1 ￿￿￿ n-1 if (ci - ci-1) / (vi - vi-1) <
(ci+1 - ci) / (vi+1 - vi). This is the case given the assumption that marginal cost ci = c(vi)
is increasing and convex in quality vi. Similarly, it follows that qn < q  if (cn - cn-1) /
(vn - vn-1) < g(q ) = q . Finally, it can be verified that q  < q1 if q  - 1 / f(q ) < (c1 - p0) /
(v1 - v0).
4. Comparative statics in quality
Recall that the only exogenous variables in the model are the qualities vi, which influence
both demand and marginal cost. The tests for the presence of monopoly power are
correspondingly based on the comparative statics predictions of qualities on prices.
These can be easily computed using the reduced form pricing equations (3.2). I
demonstrate that the comparative statics in the presence of monopoly power are likely to
be distinct from the comparative statics under more competitive conduct.
Using (3.2), the following comparative statics can be computed:
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,  i, k = 1 ￿￿￿ n8
These comparative statics yield a strong prediction and a weak prediction of
monopoly power.
Strong prediction of monopoly power: The price of product i, pi, does not depend on
the qualities vi+1 ￿￿￿ vn.
Weak prediction of monopoly power: If g¢¢(x) = 0, then the price of product i, pi, does
not depend on the qualities v1 ￿￿￿ vi-1.
The strong prediction of monopoly power follows straightforward from the above
computations. The weak prediction follows from the above computations and the fact
that g¢(qk) = g¢(qk+1) and g(qk) - g¢(qk)qk = g(qk+1) - g¢(qk+1)qk+1  if g¢¢(x) = 0. Notice that
the weak prediction applies to several frequently used distributions of the taste parameter
$\theta$, including the uniform, the Pareto and the exponential. In the Appendix this is
illustrated by a more general distribution function for which g¢¢(x) = 0, nesting the above
three distributions as special cases.
An important question is whether there exist interesting economic models of
equilibrium behavior that yield different predictions than the strong and weak predictions
of monopoly power derived above. If not, then not much interesting can be learned from
rejection of the predictions of monopoly power.
Consider first the simple model of perfect competition. In this model price equals
marginal cost, i.e. pi = ci = c(vi). As in Panzar and Rosse (1987), the model of perfect
competition then yields the same prediction as the model with monopoly power: the
qualities of firm i's competitors do not influence the price of firm i.
6 However, the
equilibrium notion of perfect competition is not a very plausible one when there are only
a finite, and typically small, number of firms in the industry. A more sensible equilibrium
notion that captures strategic interaction among a finite number of firms is the Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is defined by the conditions that each firm unilaterally
maximizes its own profit with respect to its own price, given the prices set by its
competitors. Only if the number of firms goes to infinity the pricing equations reduce to
                                               
6  As noted by Panzar and Rosse (1987), perfect competition and monopoly have in common that
there is no strategic interaction. This may be the reason why they yield the same comparative
statics.9
the marginal cost equations of perfect competition. In the more plausible case with a
finite number of firms the reduced form pricing equations do not have a simple solution.
The simple special cases of two, three or four firms with a uniform or an exponential
distribution of the taste parameter q nevertheless all yield the following prediction of
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, in sharp contrast with the predictions of monopoly power.
7
Prediction of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium: The price of product i may depend on all
qualities v1 ￿￿￿ vn, even if g¢¢(x) = 0. Furthermore, the qualities vi+1 ￿￿￿ vn have a positive
impact on pi, whereas the qualities v1 ￿￿￿ vi-1 may have a negative or positive impact on pi.
Intuitively, an increase in the quality of a higher quality competitor j, j > i, both increases
j's marginal cost and decreases j's substitutability for i, so that the price of product i, pi,
increases under Bertrand competition. In contrast, an increase in the quality of a lower
quality competitor j, j < i, increases j's marginal cost but also increases j's substitutability
for i, so that the price of product i, pi, may either decrease or increase under Bertrand
competition.
Note that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is certainly not the only plausible alternative
to the equilibrium with monopoly power. In particular, there may be equilibria that lie
somewhere in between these two extremes.
8 These ''in-between'' equilibria are likely to
yield similar qualitative to the predictions of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, although the
predictions may not be as clear-cut. To simplify the discussion below I will focus
attention to the two extremes.
5. Empirical tests for monopoly power
The above findings suggest to estimate a general regression model in which the price pi is
allowed to depend on all qualities vk. Take the following linearized approximation:
h(pi) = bi,1v1 + ￿￿￿ + bi,i-1vi-1 + vi + ai,i+1 vi+1 + ￿￿￿ + ai,nvn + ˛i ,   (5.1)
                                               
7  The calculations of the given examples are straightforward, and available on request.
8  Formally, such equilibria may be modeled in a repeated game in which the discount factor is not
sufficiently large for the monopoly solution to be sustainable, but sufficiently large for an
equilibrium in between the monopoly and the Bertrand-Nash solution to be sustainable.10
where h(pi) is an increasing transformation of pi, and where ˛i is a ''prediction error'',
possibly including an error in measuring price (e.g. due to unobserved discounts, as in
Bresnahan, 1987). Measure the qualities vi by a vector of physical characteristics, xi,
according to
vi = xig, (5.2)
where g is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
The hypotheses to be tested are the predictions of monopoly power. If the strong
prediction of monopoly power holds, then all ai,j = 0. If in addition the weak prediction
of monopoly power holds, then all ai,j = bi,j= 0, so that h(pi) = vi + ˛i = xig + ˛i, which is
just the popular hedonic specification.
9 If the hypotheses of monopoly power are
rejected, then the alternative hypothesis of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium holds. In this case
the prediction of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, based on the examples and intuition
discussed in the previous section, suggests that ai,j > 0, whereas the sign of bi,j is
ambiguous.
Unfortunately, to estimate (5.1) a tremendous amount of data is required. Even if
quality is directly observed (or g is known), there remain n-1 x n parameters to be
estimated (the ai,j and bi,j). A particular market at a particular period in time consists of
just n observations, implying the need for data on a very large number of markets and/or
time periods. Furthermore, the parameters may not even be stable over the markets or
time periods. Clearly, some structure should be imposed on the parameters ai,j and bi,j to
make estimation possible. In principle, this structure may be derived explicitly from the
model of vertical product differentiation, after imposing specific functional form
assumptions, and after defining an equilibrium notion, covering the monopoly equilibrium
                                               
9  The hedonic regression model may therefore not only be founded in a perfectly competitive
framework, as in Rosen (1973), but also in a perfect monopoly framework. For example, the
frequently used hedonic regression ln(pi) = vi + ˛i is the monopoly solution if the distribution
function Fm(x) given in the Apprendix by (A.1) holds, and the marginal cost function is given by
c(vi) = (1+m)(exp vi - p0) + p0 - ( )( ) q q mq - + - v v i 0 , as may be easily verified from (A.2). This
marginal cost function is increasing for vi > ln( ) ( ) q q mq m - + + / 1 , and convex, as required.11
and some other possible equilibria, such as the Bertrand-Nash, as special cases.
However, such an approach would share many of the problems of the structural form
approach: it would quickly become computationally intractable, and the imposed
structure would remain partly arbitrary anyway, as it depends on the specific functional
form assumptions. It are precisely these problems that I am trying to avoid here!
I therefore follow an alternative, more flexible approach and directly impose various
alternative restrictions on the parameters ai,j and bi,j in(5.1). More specifically, I propose
to estimate the following alternative regression models to test for the presence of
monopoly power.
Regression 1:  ln(pi) = bvi-1 + vi + avi+1 + ˛i
Regression 2:  ln(pi) = b2vi-2 + b1vi-1 + vi + a1vi+1 + a2vi+2 + ˛i
Regression 3:  ln(pi) = b
2vi-2 + bvi-1 + vi + avi+1 + a
2 vi+2 + ˛i
Regression 4:
ln(pi)  = b
i-1 v1 + b
i-2 v2 + ￿￿￿ + bvi-1 + vi + avi+1 + ￿￿￿ + a
n-i-1 vn-1 + a
n-i vn + ˛i   
In all these regressions price enters logarithmically, i.e. h(pi) = ln(pi). The regressions
then generalize one of the most frequently used hedonic specifications, i.e. ln(pi) =
vi + ˛i. I also experimented with specifications in which h(pi) =  pi , but this did not
affect the empirical results.
10
The structure imposed on the parameters ai,j and bi,j is based on the intuition that if
the presence of monopoly power is rejected, i.e. if ai,j or bi,j are different from zero, then
especially the qualities of product i's ''close'' competitors are likely to influence the price
of product i. It can be verified that this is indeed the case under the alternative hypothesis
of Bertrand competition, using the above mentioned examples of two, three or four firms
with a uniform or exponential distribution of the taste parameter q. The first regression
model imposes the most restrictive structure: it allows product i's price to be a function
                                               
10  I found it desirable to restrict experimentation to concave transformations of price. As can be
verified, this restriction is natural given that marginal cost should be convex in quality for all
products to have positive markets shares.12
only of its closest lower and higher quality variant. Regression 2 also allows product i's
price to be a function of its second closest lower and higher quality variant. Regression 3
is a special case of regression 2, restricting the influence of the two lower and higher
quality variants to be geometrically declining. Regression 4 applies this geometrically
declining sequence to all lower and higher quality variants of product i.
Using (5.2), regressions 1, 2, and 3 can be easily estimated using some nonlinear least
squares estimator. To estimate regression 4 I apply a transformation similar to the Koyck
transformation. As shown in the Appendix regression 4 can be transformed into:
(1 + ab)(1 - Li - Hi) ln(pi) = (1 - ab)vi +
b(1 - Li) ln(pi-1) + a(1 - Hi) ln(pi+1) + ˛i(1 + ab) - b(1 - Li)˛i-1 - a(1 - Hi)˛i+1,
where Li is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the product is of the lowest quality (i.e. v1)
and zero otherwise; and Hi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the product is of the highest
quality (i.e. vn) and zero otherwise. Note that this regression is autoregressive: it contains
both a lag and a lead of the endogenous variable pi. Furthermore, the error term is
serially correlated. Consequently, a least squares estimator is inconsistent and an
instrumental variable estimator is necessary to estimate regression 4. I have used the
elements of the vector of physical characteristics, xi, as well as the lags and the leads of
these elements as instruments.
Regressions 1, 2, 3 and 4 require a ''correct'' ranking of the qualities vi. If quality is
directly observed this can be easily done. More generally, however, the qualities need to
be estimated using xig. In this case I will require the ranking of the qualities to be
consistent with the estimates in the following sense: the ranking of the qualities as
implied by the estimates should not contradict the ranking that was assumed to obtain the
estimates. To obtain a consistent ranking I use the following procedure. In a first stage I
set aij = bij = 0 in (5.1) and estimate the model. An initial estimate of the qualities vi = xig
is then obtained, allowing to order the qualities. Then a second stage begins in which the
model is re-estimated, including the parameters aij  and bij. The new estimates can then
be used to re-order the qualities once again. This procedure is repeated until
convergence is reached, i.e. until the qualities do no longer need to be reordered.13
6. Two applications
I have used two different samples to illustrate the proposed tests for monopoly power:
the market for spreadsheets in the U.S. (1986-1991) and the market for ''engine variants''
in the 1990 French car market.
11
The first sample covers 6 years of the U.S. spreadsheet market, with about 15
spreadsheet programs per year. This yields a panel of 91 spreadsheet observations for the
period 1986-1991. This sample is used to test the hypothesis of monopoly power across
spreadsheet programs sold at a given time period. The following variables are used
here.
12 The endogenous variable is LPRICE, the log of the list price of a single copy of
the spreadsheet program. The exogenous variables are several physical characteristics,
measuring the quality of the spreadsheet. The variable LMINRC is the log of the
minimum of the maximum number of rows and columns that the spreadsheet can handle.
The dummy variable LOTUS equals one if the program is produced by Lotus
Development Corporation, and equals zero otherwise. The dummy variable GRAPHS
equals one if the program can perform all basic graphs. WINDOW is a variable equal to
two if the maximum number of windows on the screen is sixteen or more; equal to one if
this maximum is from two to fifteen; and equal to zero otherwise. LOCOMP is a dummy
variable equal to one if the program is compatible with the Lotus (WKS, WK1) format.
EXTDAT is a dummy variable equal to one if the program provides links to external data
bases. LANCOM is a dummy variable equal to one if the program can link independent
users through a local area network. LINKING is a dummy variable equal to one if the
values in several worksheets can be updated at the same time. In addition to these
physical characteristics there are 5 time dummy variables TIME87, TIME88, TIME89,
TIME90, TIME91.
Using the above variables, Table 1 presents estimates of the vector g in (5.1) and
(5.2), assuming h(pi) = ln(pi) and restricting aij = bij = 0. Recall that this is just a simple
hedonic regression, which holds under the null hypothesis of monopoly power.
                                               
11  The data on spreadsheets were provided by Neil Gandal. The data on the French car market were
collected from the catalogues Automobil Revue and l'Auto-Journal.
12  See Gandal (1994) for a more detailed discussion of these data.14
The included variables in this regression are selected from a larger set of variables, based
on their significant contribution to the regression.
13 The parameter estimates of the
physical characteristics all have the expected positive sign. The time dummy variables
have negative parameter estimates, indicating that the ''quality adjusted'' price of
spreadsheets is decreasing over time.
The second sample consists of 38 popular European models sold in the 1990 French
car market. The Renault Clio and the Volkswagen Golf are examples of these models.
Each model is sold in about 5 different engine variants. This yields a panel of 196
observations on engine variants. This sample is used to test the hypothesis of monopoly
power across the different engine variants sold by the same given car model.
14 The
following data are used. The endogenous variable is LPRICE, which is the log of the list
price of a variant. The variable WEIGHT is the total weight of the car, including all
equipment (in ton). WIDTH is the maximum width (in m). HORSEPOWER is the
variant's maximum horsepower (in 100 kilowatt). DIESEL is a dummy variable equal to
one if the variant has a diesel engine. CYLINDER is the cylinder volume (in dm
3).
Different engine variants of the same model have the same width and approximately the
same weight. They differ in horsepower, cylinder volume and diesel. A base model is
defined as the variant of a particular model with the lowest specification of horsepower
and cylinder volume, and without diesel. I did not include dummy variables to estimate
the ''model-specific effects'' (analogous to the time dummies in the sample of
spreadsheets). This uses up many degrees of freedom (38), and the model-specific effects
are captured fairly well by the included model-specific characteristics WEIGHT and
WIDTH anyway.
Using the above variables Table 2 presents estimates of g in (5.1) and (5.2), again
assuming h(pi) = ln(pi) and restricting aij = bij = 0. These variables are selected from a
                                               
13  The larger set of variables is discussed in Gandal (1994). It is worth mentioning that it was
possible to replicate his results. As shown by Gandal (1994), the used specification is not entirely
stable over time. The parameters of the variables LMINRC, LANCOM and LINKING differ
significantly over two separate sample periods (1986-1988 versus 1989-1991). I therefore also
applied the tests for monopoly power to the ''unstable'' specification, and obtained similar results.
14  Competition across different models will be ignored here. I come back to this restriction in
section 7.15
regression with a larger set of variables, based on their significance. This larger set also
included the characteristics LENGTH, HEIGHT, NUMCYL (number of cylinders), and
firm dummy variables (for Fiat, Ford, GM, PSA, Renault and Volkswagen).
15 All
parameter estimates have the expected positive sign.
The hedonic parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are used to obtain an initial
ranking of the qualities. In the first sample the qualities of all spreadsheets in each given
year are ranked. In the second sample the qualities of all engine variants of each given
car model are ranked. Then an initial estimate is obtained of the parameters in
Regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Based on these estimates a new ranking of qualities is
obtained. Regressions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are then re-estimated until a re-ordering is no longer
required.
16 The estimates of the parameters a and b (and ai and bi in the case of
regression 2) are presented on Tables 3 and 4. To save space, the estimates of the other
parameters are not presented. They generally did not differ very much from the estimates
in Tables 1 and 2.
The results in Table 3 are in stark contrast with the results in Table 4. In Table 3, the
market for spreadsheets, almost all estimates of a and b are significantly different from
zero, with the exception of some of the estimates for regression 2. All significant
estimates of a are positive; all significant estimates of b are negative. The insignificant
estimates in regression 2 may be due to the little structure imposed in this regression.
This is suggested by the significant estimate of a and b in regression 3, which is a
restricted version of regression 2. In contrast, in Table 4, the market for ''engine
variants'', the estimates of the parameters a and b are usually not significant.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimates of a and b is much smaller in the market for
engine variants (Table 4) than in the market for spreadsheets (Table 3).
17
                                               
15  The stability of the parameters of the included variables was tested by running two separate
(hedonic) regressions, one for a sample of only French cars, one for a sample of only foreign cars.
All parameters turned out to be stable.
16  In the case of engine variants two iterations were required. In the case of spreadsheets convergence
was not always obtained. However, the parameter estimates did not alter very much over iterations.
In case of no convergence the estimates after two iterations are presented.
17  Some care had to be taken to allow for a reasonable comparison of the magnitudes of a and b. I
multiplied the prices of spreadsheets by a constant factor, determined such that the average price of
spreadsheets equals the average price of engine variants. In a hedonic regression, with the16
These contrasting results may be interpreted as follows. The presence of monopoly
power is significantly rejected in the market for spreadsheets. This follows from the fact
that the characteristics of product i's competitors significantly influence the price of
product i. Note that the signs of a (positive) and b (negative) are consistent with the
alternative hypothesis of Bertrand competition. The presence of monopoly power over
price on different engine variants of a given car model cannot be rejected by the data.
The empirical results are consistent with several facts. First, the results are consistent
with the ownership structure in both markets. Different spreadsheets programs are
usually owned by different firms, whereas different engine variants of a specific car
model are of course owned by the same firm. The rejection of monopoly power in the
market for spreadsheets is also consistent with the relatively large number of active firms
(usually between ten or fifteen during each year) and the high annual entry and exit rates.
These factors probably make collusion difficult. Finally, the presence of monopoly power
in the market for engine power is consistent with Scherer's (1980, p. 394) observation
(for the American market). He quotes a ''leaked'' memorandum on the 1966 American
Ford Galaxie sedan, stating that the wholesale price exceeds accounting cost by up to
293 percent for the high quality engine variants compared to only 17 percent for the
lowest quality variant, a price discrimination practice which is easier to explain in the
presence of monopoly power than in the absence of it.
The consistency of the empirical results with the a priori evidence on both markets is
encouraging. It suggests that the developed empirical tests can also be used in other
applications, in which it is less obvious a priori whether or not monopoly power is
present. For policy purposes one may then view the tests as one extra piece of possible
evidence for the presence (or absence) of monopoly power.
                                                                                                                                         
ln(PRICE) as the dependent variable, this multiplication of course only affects the constant in the
vector g. This is no longer the case in regressions 1, 2, 3 and 4, because there is no ''true'' constant
term in these regressions. It was actually not possible to estimate such a ''true'' constant term, given
the included constant in the vector g.17
7. Suggested extensions
The tests for monopoly power proposed in this paper are based on a fairly general model
of vertical product differentiation, covering past theoretical and empirical applications as
special cases, for example Bresnahan's (1987) analysis of collusive behavior in the
American car market between 1954-1956. Nevertheless, the results ought to be
interpreted with care. Some important assumptions have still been made. These should be
relaxed in further work.
The first assumption is that product differentiation occurs in just one quality
dimension. This is in fact equivalent to assuming several quality dimensions as long as
consumer preferences for quality are perfectly correlated over these dimensions.
However, it is possible that such a perfect correlation does not hold in the above
considered samples. In both the market for spreadsheets and the market for engine
variants there may be two main quality dimensions. In the market for spreadsheets, a first
dimension is ''power'', as captured by the variables LMINRC, GRAPHS, WINDOW and
LINKING. A second dimension is ``network accessibility'', as captured by the variables
LOCOMP, EXTDAT and LANCOM. Consumer preferences may not be perfectly
correlated over these two quality dimensions. Similarly, in the market for ''engine
variants'' a first quality dimension is engine power, as captured by HORSEPOWER and
CYLINDER. The variable DIESEL captures a second quality dimension of an engine
variant, and it is again not clear whether consumer preferences are perfectly correlated
over these two dimensions. The assumption that products are differentiated in just one
quality dimension is empirically translated in the assumption that it is possible to
unambiguously rank all products according to their 'quality'. It would be a very
interesting topic for future research to analyze how empirical tests would generalize if
such an unambiguous ranking is not possible because of the presence of more than one
(say two) quality dimensions.
The second assumption made in the analysis is that each vertically differentiated
market can be treated as an independent market, without substitution across markets. In
the case of spreadsheets sold in a given time period, this assumption means that there is
no intertemporal substitution. In the case of engine variants of a given car model, the18
assumption means that there is no substitution between different car models. Even
though the above mentioned evidence by Scherer (1980) suggests that this assumption
may not be too unreasonable for the variants other than the base models,
18 I remained
worried with this assumption. I therefore repeated the tests for a limited sample of only
the French cars. One may expect that the assumption of no substitution between different
models is more reasonable for domestic firms. Indeed, using a structural form model of
competition between base models Verboven (1995) shows that French models have a lot
of domestic market power, in contrast to the foreign firms. The empirical results based
on this limited sample turned out to be quite similar to those of the full sample.
Of course, the need for relaxing the assumption of independent markets and of one-
dimensional vertical differentiation -- remains, in order to widen the scope for interesting
economic applications.
A. Appendix
A class of distributions for which g¢¢(x) = 0.





















with q˛  ( ) [ ] q q q q m , / + -  if m > 0, and q˛ [ ] q,¥ , if m £  0.
19 The uniform distribution
obtains if m = 1; the exponential obtains if m = 0; the Pareto obtains if m = -q  =
-1/(1+l) and q  = 0. It is easy to verify that g¢¢(x) = 0 for this distribution. Furthermore,
one can use (3.2) to find the reduced form pricing equation F(x) = Fm(x):
pi = p0 + 
1
1+ m
 (c(vi) p0 + (q  - q  + mq) (vi - v0))   (A.2)
                                               
18  The fact that car manufacturers often only advertize prices of their base models, and not of the
other variants, reinforces this suggestive evidence. See Diamond (1971) for a provocative model of
competition when consumers do not observe prices costlessly.19
Clearly, the price of product i does not depend on the quality of product i's competitors
in this example.
Transformation of regression 4.
To transform regression 4 note first that for i = 1 ￿￿￿ n - 1
ln(pi) - a ln(pi+1) = (1 - ab) (b
i-1 v1 + b
i-2 v2 + ￿￿￿ bvi-1 + vi) +˛i - a˛i+1,
This yields for observations i = 2 ￿￿￿ n - 1
(ln(pi) - a ln(pi+1) - b(ln(pi-1) - a ln(pi)) = (1 - ab)vi +˛i - a˛i+1 - b(˛i-1 - a˛i),
or
(1 + ab)(ln(pi) = (1 - ab) vi + b(ln(pi-1) + a ln(pi+1) + ˛i(1 + ab) - b˛i-1 + a˛i+1.
Similarly, for the first and the n-th observation:
ln(p1) = (1 - ab)v1 + a ln(p2) + ˛1 - a˛2
ln(pn) = (1 - ab)vn + b ln(pn-1) + ˛n - b˛n-1.
Define a dummy variable Li = 1 if the product is of the lowest quality (the first
observation), and Li = 0 otherwise. Similarly define Hi = 1 if the product is of the highest
quality (the n-th observation) and Hi = 0 otherwise. Then it is possible to write
regression 4, for i = 1 ￿￿￿ n as:
(1 + ab)(1 - Li - Hi) ln(pi) = (1 - ab)vi +
b(1 - Li) ln(pi-1) + a(1 - Hi) ln(pi+1) + ˛i(1 + ab) - b(1 - Li)˛i-1 - a(1 - Hi)˛i+1.
                                                                                                                                         
19  Notice a slightly different notation for the upperbound. It does not necessarily coincide with q , as
it was denoted before.20
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Table 1. Hedonic specification
Equation (5) with a aij=b bij=0,
Dependent variable ln(PRICE)
Spreadsheet programs (91 observations)
Variable Parameter t-statistic
CONSTANT     3.76    12.31
TIME87     -.06     -.38
TIME88     -.44    -2.67
TIME89     -.70    -4.20
TIME90     -.79    -4.90
TIME91     -.85    -5.30
LMINRC      .11     1.59
LOTUS      .56     4.36
GRAPHS      .46     3.51
WINDOW      .17     2.14
LOCOMP      .72     5.28
EXTDAT      .55     4.05
LANCOM      .21     1.65
LINKING      .21     1.91
Std. error of
regr.
     .39
R
2      .86
Note: these results coincide with Gandal's (1994) regression 2 and
3.22
Table 2. Hedonic specification
Equation (5) with a aij=b bij=0
Dependent variable ln(PRICE)
Engine variants (196 observations)
Variable Parameter t-statistic
CONSTANT     3.39    14.59
WEIGHT      .56     5.56
WIDTH      .46     2.57
HORSEPOWER      .60    15.84
DIESEL      .13     5.66
CYLINDER      .97     2.84
Std. error of
regr.
     .09
R
2      .95
Table 3. Equation (5), alternative specifications
Spreadsheet Programs
Parameter t-statistic
Regression 1 a    .046   4.00
b   -.160  -3.93
Regression 2 a1    .038   1.14
a2    .016    .34
b1   -.204  -3.24
b2    .139   1.41
Regression 3 a    .035   3.38
b   -.039  -1.28
Regression 4 a    .052   5.28
b   -.120  -2.94
Note: standard errors and t-statistics are computed from heteroscedastic
consistent matrix.23
Table 4. Equation (5), alternative specifications
Engine variants
Parameter t-statistic
Regression 1 a   -.007  -1.54
b   -.005  -1.29
Regression 2 a1   -.007  -1.68
a2    .003    .75
b1   -.003   -.89
b2   -.001   -.19
Regression 3 a   -.006  -1.48
b   -.003   -.88
Regression 4 a   -.007  -1.53
b   -.006  -1.65
Note: standard errors and t-statistics are computed from heteroscedastic-
consistent matrix.